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INTRODUCTION
By the time this article appears in print, commentary on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in the case of Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill,' which pitted the snail darter, a three-
inch member of the perch family, against T.V.A.'s Tellico Dam,
will undoubtedly have been published or have gone to press. Few
recent cases have attracted the degree of national publicity this
controversy has, and more than one environmental law scholar
will assuredly fully examine the ethical and practical ramifica-
tions of the Court's decision affirming the Sixth Circuit's deter-
mination that closure of the dam should be enjoined.
Because of the author's personal involvement in the case as
co-plaintiff-respondent and co-counsel,2 however, it became ap-
parent that further insight might be gleaned from the decision
than that provided by more traditional law review discussion.
Although the Supreme Court's decision is, of course, unmistaka-
bly significant in its holding3 that, despite T.V.A.'s expenditure
of millions of dollars on the Tellico Project prior to the effective
date of the Endangered Species Act4 and the listing of the fish as"endangered," the Act prevents completion of the project be-
cause impoundment of the river would jeopardize the existence
of the snail darter and modify or destroy its habitat,5 the author
found equally fascinating the apparent roles the various Justices
seemed to play during oral argument of the case and the predic-
tive value of the questions posed and comments made by the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law; A.B. Wash-
ington University (St. Louis), 1967; J.D. Northwestern University School of Law, 1970.
1. 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978).
2. At the time the lawsuit was initially filed, the author was a member of the faculty
of the University of Tennessee College of Law. Other plaintiffs were Zygmunt J.B. Plater,
then also on the Tennessee faculty and now a professor at Wayne State University Law
School, and Hiram G. Hill, then a University of Tennessee law student and now in legal
practice in Tennessee. The Tennessee Audubon Council and the Association of Southeast-
ern Biologists were added as plaintiffs prior to trial.
3. 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2301-02 (1978).
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976) (effective date, December 28, 1973).
5. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976).
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members of the Court.
This article will, therefore, analyze the transcript of oral ar-
gument in T. V.A. v. Hill and compare and contrast the apparent
predispositions of the Justices as evidenced by their inquiries and
remarks at the Supreme Court hearing with the positions ulti-
mately taken by them. In this connection, the article will evalu-
ate the hypothesis that several of the Justices assumed specific
roles during the argument based upon their predispositions con-
cerning the substantive issues involved. Last, some general obser-
vations concerning predictability of Supreme Court decisions
based upon oral argument interchange will be made. Hopefully,
they will prove to be interesting to students of the Court and
perhaps useful to students of appellate advocacy in general.
BACKGROUND
Before a meaningful examination of the Supreme Court hear-
ing can be made, a brief discussion' of the case's factual and
procedural background is necessary. T.V.A. first proposed a dam
on the Little Tennessee River near its junction with the Tennes-
see River, the present site of Tellico Dam, in 1936. Congress ini-
tially appropriated funds for the project in 1966, and construction
began in 1967. In the early 1970's, federal litigation" concerning
the adequacy of T.V.A.'s environmental impact statement re-
quired by the National Environmental Policy Act' delayed con-
struction for twenty months, after which the district court found
that the final environmental impact statement complied with the
law.'0 The dam, which would impound the last remaining thirty-
three miles of free-flowing river in the Tennessee River system"
and thereby destroy a number of archeological sites of great his-
torical significance'" and cover some 16,500 acres-much of which
6. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Brennan,
Stewart, White, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Justice Blackmun joined. Justice Rehnquist filed a separate dissenting opinion.
7. For a more complete statement of the factual background of the Tellico Dam
controversy, see 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2283-90 (1978).
8. Environmental Defense Fund v. T.V.A., 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 468
F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
10. Environmental Defense Fund v. T.V.A., 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973),
aff'd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974).
11. There are 68 dams throughout the Tennessee Valley, 22 of which are within 60
miles of Tellico Dam. Brief for Respondents at 4, T.V.A. v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978).
12. These historical sites include Fort Loudon, established in 1756 as England's
Southeastern outpost in the French and Indian War, and the ancient Cherokee towns of
Echota, the capital of the Cherokee nation as early as the 16th century, and Tennase, the
location providing the linguistic basis for the name of the State of Tennessee.
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is productive farmland-with water, was justified in terms of
flood control, navigation, electrical power, 3 industrial develop-
ment," and recreation. A recent study by the General Accounting
Office, 5 however, has cast suspicion on the alleged benefits of the
project, and a T.V.A.-U.S. Department of Interior Report' pre-
pared in August of 1978 indicates that many of the stated benefits
can be achieved without closing the dam's gates and thereby
bringing about the snail darter's extinction.
In August, 1973, a University of Tennessee ichthyologist dis-
covered in the portion of the Little Tennessee River to be im-
pounded by the dam a species of fish he did not believe had
previously been scientifically identified. Further investigation led
him to the conclusion that the fish, the "snail darter,"' 7 requires
a shallow, fast-flowing, clear, riverine environment with a clean
gravel bottom to live and reproduce, and that the creation of
Tellico Reservoir as a deep, silted, nonflowing lake, would destroy
the fish's habitat and render it extinct within a few years. Four
months after the discovery, the Endangered Species Act of 1973
became effective. Section 7 of the Act states that federal agencies,
in consultation with the Secretary of Interior, shall utilize their
authorities by carrying out programs to conserve species listed as
endangered and threatened under the Act and
by taking such action necessary to insure that actions author-
ized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the con-
tinued existence of such endangered species and threatened
species or result in the destruction or modification of habitat of
such species which is determined by the Secretary [of Interior]
...to be critical.'"
In January of 1975, two of the plaintiffs petitioned the Secre-
tary of Interior to list the fish as endangered. After ten months
of administrative proceedings, the Secretary determined the snail
13. Tellico Dam itself contains no electrical generators, but an interreservoir canal
connecting Tellico Reservoir with Fort Loudon Dam, one mile downstream on the Tennes-
see River, would augment the latter's generating capacity.
14. The Boeing Aerospace Company withdrew as developer of the proposed model
town, Timberlake, in March, 1975. TENNESSEE VALLEY AuTHoRrrY AND U.S. DEP'T OF
INTERIOR, ALTERNATIVES FOR COMPLETING THE TELLICO PRoJEcr 8 (draft report, August 10,
1978).
15. COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GENERAL AccouNTLro OmcE RE-
PORT No. EMD - 77-58 (October 14, 1977).
16. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY AND U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ALTERNATIVES FOR COM-
PLETING THE TELLICO PROJECT (draft report, August 10, 1978).
17. The snail darter, later given the scientific name of Percina Imostoma tanasi, is a
member of the perch family, and feeds in large part upon fresh water snails.
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976).
19781
92 University of Puget Sound Law Review
darter lives only in that portion of the river that would be inun-
dated, and closing the dam would result in the destruction of the
fish and its habitat. The formal listing of the snail darter as an
endangered species19 became effective on November 10, 1975.
During this period and at several subsequent times, T.V.A. in-
formed a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropria-
tions 3° of the controversy concerning the snail darter; the House
Committee, nevertheless, recommended that additional funds be
appropriated for the completion of the project.
Consultation between the Department of Interior and T.V.A.
proved fruitless, and in February of 1976, the plaintiffs filed a
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Tennessee seeking a temporary and permanent injunction
prohibiting the closing of the dam. The district court denied
plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction and set the matter
for trial, which was held in late April, 1976. The snail darter's
habitat in the Little Tennessee River had been determined to be"critical" pursuant to Section 7 of the Act in early April, 1976.21
On May 25, 1976, the district court entered its opinion denying
the plaintiffs' requested relief and dismissing the complaint.22
The court took this position in spite of its findings that closure
of the dam and subsequent impoundment of the river would ad-
versely modify, if not completely destroy, the snail darter's criti-
cal habitat, making it highly probable the fish's continued exist-
ence would be jeopardized.Y The district court based its decision
on its inherent equitable power to consider such factors as the
project's percentage of completion, the $53 million the court
found would be irretrievably lost if the project were not com-
pleted, and T.V.A. testimony that other than scrapping the entire
project, no viable alternatives to closure of the dam existed that
would preserve the snail darter. 2
In January of 1977, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit3 agreed with plaintiffs' argument that the trial court had
abused its discretion by not issuing an injunction in the face of a
clear federal statutory violation. The court reversed the lower
court decision and remanded the case with instructions that a
19. 40 Fed. Reg. 47,505 (1975).
20. The Endangered Species Act originally was the responsibility of the House Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, not the Appropriations Committee.
21. 41 Fed. Reg. 13,926 (1976).
22. Hill v. T.V.A., 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
23. Id. at 757.
24. But see text accompanying note 16 supra.
25. Hill v. T.V.A., 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
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permanent injunction issue halting all Tellico Project activities
that may destroy or modify the snail darter's critical habitat.2 6
The injunction was to remain in effect until Congress specifically
exempts the project from the operation of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act or the Secretary of Interior removes the fish from endan-
gered status.
On April 18, 1978, the United States Supreme Court heard
oral argument on the case, and on June 15, 1978, the Court af-
firmed the Sixth Circuit's decision, thus leaving the permanent
injunction in effect." Chief Justice Burger, writing for the major-
ity, noted the clear findings of the trial court, undisputed on
appeal, that the snail darter's existence would be jeopardized and
its habitat modified or destroyed by the project's completion. 28
He observed that the language of section 7 makes no exception
for projects underway on the date of the Act's passage,2 and
further noted that congressional appropriations could not, by
implication, be permitted to repeal the clear application of the
Act to the Tellico Project.30 Last, he indicated that, despite the
inherent power of a chancellor to balance the equities involved,
to permit the trial judge to do so in these circumstances would
undermine the nation's commitment to the doctrine of separation
of powers. 31 That is, it is for the legislative, not the judicial,
branch to determine whether, despite a violation of federal law,
public policy, through a weighing of benefits and costs, demands
the Tellico Project be completed. Justices Brennan, Stewart,
White, Marshall, and Stevens joined the Chief Justice in his
opinion. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissented, 32
arguing that Congress could not have intended section 7 of the
Act to prohibit the operation of a substantially completed federal
project, particularly where a long history of congressional aware-
ness of the controversy with continued appropriations was in evi-
dence. Justice Rehnquist filed a separate dissent33 in which he
concluded the Act did not prohibit the district court from refus-
ing, in the exercise of its traditional equitable powers, to enjoin
closure of the dam.
26. Id. at 1075.
27. T.V.A. v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978).
28. Id. at 2290.
29. Id. at 2291-98.
30. Id. at 2299-301.
31. Id. at 2301-02.
32. Id. at 2302-10.
33. Id. at 2310-11.
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ANALYSIS OF ORAL ARGUMENT
With this background in mind, an examination of the Su-
preme Court oral argument can proceed. Justices Stevens and
Stewart will be discussed first.
At a very early point in the argument, it becomes obvious
Justice Stevens plays a quite specific role in support of the plain-
tiffs' position. For example, after a brief factual opening state-
ment, Attorney General Griffin Bell, who argued on behalf of the
Tennessee Valley Authority, holds up for the Court's observation
a plastic vial containing a fish.
ATrORNEY GENERAL BELL: I have in my hand a darter, a snail
darter. It was Exhibit No. 7 in the case when it was filed. And
we brought that with us so you could see it. It's three inches. It
is supposed to be a full grown snail darter, about three inches
in length.
JUSTICE BRENNAN: Is it alive?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: I've been wondering what it's in if it
is.
[Laughter.]
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: It seems to move around. I've been
puzzled over that.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Attorney General, your exhibit makes me
wonder. Does the Government take the position that some en-
dangered species are entitled to more protection than others?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Well, I don't take it this morning,
because I don't have to. I don't have to reach that point.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Your argument would apply to every endan-
gered species, American Eagle, no matter what it might be. Is
that right?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: I say that's what the Sixth Circuit
held. I wouldn't say that.
JUSTICE STEVENS: The statute, the Endangered Species Act,
doesn't distinguish as among various priorities in the different
species, does it?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: It does not. It looks to the list. Once
it gets on the list, it is an endangered species. And then this case
goes much further, because its critical habitat is the thing.
JUSTICE STEVENS: And the snail darter is on the list; there's no
question about it.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: It's on the list, and this particular area
has been designated as a-
JUSTICE STEVENS: Critical habitat.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: -critical habitat.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Right.u
34. Record at 6-7.
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Thus, Justice Stevens, apparently perceiving the Attorney Gen-
eral's attempt at frivolity as a threat to meaningful resolution of
the significant issues presented, immediately assumed the role of
redirecting discussion to the precise language of the statute and
its application to the facts presented.
Not only is Justice Stevens's role apparent in his response to
efforts to make light of the snail darter, he persists in the role
throughout the hearing, particularly in reply to arguments that
attempt to undermine his predisposition in favor of plaintiffs'
position. Thus, approximately halfway through Attorney General
Bell's argument, after the Chief Justice notes the controversy has
been called to the attention of Congress, the following inter-
change takes place.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: It has been; everytime they said, go
forward.
Now that would be the last argument that I would argue if
I needed to argue it.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Did Congress ever grant an exemption from
the Endangered Species Act for the snail darter?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: They have not.
JUSTICE STEVENS: And they were very much aware of this prob-
lem, weren't they?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: They are aware of it and-
JusTIcE STEVENS: Might it have been the most unambiguous way
to resolve the whole thing?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: That would be it, and that's my last
point.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Much better than just hiding it in a committee
report in an appropriations bill.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Well, the last-in '77 they put it on
the face of the statute, $2 million to move-
JUSTICE STEVENS: $2 million; so they thought the snail darter was
worth $2 million, but not $130 million.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: I would say that would be a fair infer-
ence.35
Justice Stevens's position is, by this time, quite apparent. He
continues to challenge the Attorney General with such questions
as:
JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Attorney General, can I ask one question
about your argument about why the statute doesn't apply?
Are you saying that the statute merely requires
35. Id. at 20.
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consultation? Or are you saying that completing the dam would
not be an action within the meaning of the statute?36
Bell admits closure would be an "action" but argues that an
injunction is nevertheless inappropriate. Then, a short time later,
in response to a question from Justice Stewart concerning pend-
ing legislation that would amend section 7 of the Act, Attorney
General Bell responds that there is legislation at the committee
level that would specifically exempt the Tellico Project from
compliance with the Act. 37 Justice Stevens immediately pro-
pounds plaintiffs' theory by observing:
JUSTICE STEVENS: Of course that would still be possible, Mr.
Attorney General, if we were to sustain the injunction. Congress
could always exclude the snail darter later. But if we let the
snail darter be extinguished, I guess the choice is irrevocable.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Well, if you did that-but I don't
know of anybody that's trying to extinguish the snail darter.
Justice Stevens continues his probe of Bell's argument:
JUSTICE STEVENS: Well, the Secretary has found that he will be
so extinguished if the dam is closed.
36. Id. at 21.
37. Although the House of Representatives eventually passed legislation specifically
exempting the Tellico Project from Section 7's mandate, H.R. 14104, 95th Cong., 2d Seass.
(October 14, 1978), the Senate earlier refused to do so and instead passed a bill that would
have established a cabinet level committee to hear exemption requests. S. 2889, 95th
Cong., 2d Seass., CONG. REc. 511, 158 (daily ed. July 19, 1978).
In conference on the final day of the congressional session, both houses finally passed
a compromise bill generally adopting the Senate format. That legislation establishes a
committee composed of the Secretaries of Agriculture, Army, and Interior, the Chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisers (a change from the earlier Senate bill, which included
the Chairman of the Council of Environmental Quality instead), the Administrators of
the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration, and a presidental appointee recommended by the governor of the state affected
by the listing of a species as endangered or threatened. A lower level, three-member board
composed of a Secretary of Interior appointee, a presidential appointee suggested by the
governor of the affected state, and an administrative law judge selected by the Civil
Service Commission, would hear exemption requests and make recommendations to the
cabinet level group.
Exemptions will be granted only if the committee determines that no reasonable and
prudent alternative to the agency action exists, the action is of national or regional signifi-.
cance, and the benefits of the agency action to the public outweigh the benefits of alter-
native courses of action consistent with conserving the species or its critical habitat. The
legislation further provides that, within ninety days of the bill's enactment, the committee
must determine that the Tellico Project is not exempt from the operation of Section 7 or
the Project will be automatically exempted. S. 2889, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (October 15,
1978). At the time of printing, the Congressional Record of the final legislation was not
yet available. Information concerning the bill is from Congress Clears Legislation Allow-
ing Some Exemptions to Endangered Species Act, 36 CONG. Q. 3045-46 (weekly ed. Octo-
ber 21, 1978) (Editor's note: On January 23, 1979, the committee unanimously decided
the project should not be exempted.)
38. Record at 24.
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ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Well, but-
JUSTICE STEVENS: But don't we have to assume that's the fact for
the purposes of the decision?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: No, no, the record shows clearly that
the snail darter has been transplanted to the Hiwassee River.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Oh, therefore, it is not the critical habitat? Is
that right?
I mean, what assumption do we make for the purpose of
deciding? Is the snail darter going to be extinguished or not?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: We can't find that. Only the Secretary
under the law can find that.
JUSTICE STEVENS: And he has found it will be, hasn't he?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: That's what he found at one time.
JUSTICE STEVENS: But don't we have to assume that when we
decide the case?3"
Bell finally responds that he disagrees. To apply the Secretary's
finding to a virtually completed project, he reasons, would violate
the presumption against retroactivity. 0 Later in Bell's presenta-
tion, Justice Stevens again presses the argument that the Court
may not second-guess the Secretary of Interior's biological find-
ings. Bell discloses his displeasure that the Department of Inte-
rior has taken a position contrary to the Department of Justice-
T.V.A. view," and he remarks that the government should speak
through only one voice, the Attorney General of the United
States.'" Justice Stevens explodes:
JUSTICE STEVENS: But Mr. Attorney General, are you suggesting
that if the Secretary of the Interior has placed a species on the
endangered species list, that the Attorney General should have
the power to take if off the list.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: No, no; I'm not suggesting that.
JUSTICE STEVENS: No matter what we do, that part of the record
is before us. The Secretary of the Interior has determined that
this is an endangered species. And we have to accept that.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: And that this is a critical habitat.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Yes.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: And that's his prerogative. I'm not
denying that.
JUSTICE STEVENS: We can't second guess him on that, can we?
39. Id. at 24-25.
40. Id. at 25.
41. The appendix to the T.V.A. brief was, in fact, a brief supporting plaintiffs' posi-
tion, entitled "Views of the Secretary of the Interior." Brief for Petitioner at la-13a,
T.V.A. v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978).
42. Record at 31.
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ATroRNEY GENERAL BELL: No.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Any more than you can.4"
In contrast to his involvement in Attorney General Bell's
presentation, Justice Stevens is remarkably inactive during
plaintiff-respondents' argument, delivered by Zygmunt J.B. Pla-
ter, a Wayne State University law professor. The Justice's one
major inquiry," however, is readily predictable, since it reveals
his belief that the statute is clear on its face, and an injunction,
therefore, an appropriate remedy. Plater has noted that Congress
and the T.V.A. are presently reviewing the project and consider-
ing which benefits can be achieved in the absence of a reservoir.
Justice Marshall replies that the Court must limit its considera-
tion to the record before it, alluding to his displeasure with earlier
mention of current efforts to transplant the snail darter to the
Hiwassee River, a tributary of the main Tennessee. Plater then
attempts to utilize facts in the record to make his point concern-
ing agency consideration of alternatives, but Justice Stevens in-
terrupts.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Plater, let me interrupt you with just one
question. Because there's been an awful lot of discussion about
things that have happened since the District Court tried this
case.
Is any of that relevant to our discussion? Anything the At-
torney General said, or anything you've been telling us in re-
sponse to all these questions? We have a finding of fact that this
closing the dam would result in total destruction of the snail
darter's habitat. Do we have to know anything else?
MR. PLATER: No, Your Honor. I agree completely with Your
Honor's question. 5
43. Id. at 32.
44. The only other point at which Justice Stevens appears in the record of Plater's
argument involves another attempt to bolster plaintiffs' cause. In the transcript, a ques-
tion mark appears after Justice Stevens's name, so the court reporter was apparently
uncertain as to the source of the question. Record at 59. The question does, however, seem
typical of the role Justice Stevens had been playing throughout the argument. Justice
Powell had been questioning Plater on the logical extension of plaintiffs' argument to the
application of § 7 to a project already completed and operational, as the Grand Coulee
Dam. Sensing that Plater was going to answer that § 7 unequivocally would apply, despite
the fact that such an extreme position was not necessary to the resolution of the case in
plaintiffs' favor, Justice Stevens (?) interrupts a series of heated questions by Justices
Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist by noting his position affirmatively, thus affording Plater
the opportunity to adopt a more moderate view.
JUSTICE STEVENS: There's nothing that would require you to tear a dam down.
Record at 59. For a more complete discussion of this portion of the argument, see text
accompanying note 59 infra, where Justice Powell's inquiries are more fully explored.
45. Record at 50.
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Justice Stevens's position is, thus, quite apparent from a
very early point in the hearing. Where a federal law has been
violated, he believes an injunction is the appropriate remedy.
Other considerations are irrelevant, and any attempt to distin-
guish among protected species will not be tolerated." In large
part, this is the position of the majority opinion, in which he
joined. Justice Stevens's vote, therefore, came as no surprise.
So also, Justice Stewart's vote with the majority is predicta-
ble. The role he plays during the argument is quite similar to that
played by Justice Stevens. For instance, two-thirds through his
presentation, Attorney General Bell argues that to resolve a sec-
tion 7 dispute, factors such as the virtually completed stage of
construction, the transplantation efforts, and the fact that the
Secretary of Interior does not have a veto in these matters, must
be taken into account. He proposes as the test: "Has the T.V.A.
consulted in good faith and done all it can do under these
circumstances? 4 7 Justice Stewart reveals his predisposition
immediately.
JUSTICE STEWART: Well, the statute requires more than just con-
sultation in good faith. It does require consultation, but then it
requires, in rather clear and unambiguous words, the agency to
take such action necessary to insure that actions authorized,
funded, or carried out by it do not jeopardize the continued
existence of the endangered species, or the destruction or modi-
fication of its critical habitat. "Action necessary to insure
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Well, if you-
JUSTICE STEWART: "-that their actions do not jeopardize the
continued existence."
And as I understand it, it's conceded that the completion
of this dam will jeopardize the continued existence of this en-
dangered species, or the modification of its critical habitat.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: We don't concede-we concede it will
modify this critical habitat.
JUsTIcE STEWART: Which has been found to be the critical habi-
tat, as I understand it.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Well, unless this moving over to the
Hiwassee River makes that into a noncritical habitat.
JUsTICE STEWART: But the Secretary has determined this to be
the critical habitat, has he not?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: At the time, yes.
46. An interesting inquiry would be to determine if Justice Stevens would extend his
reasoning beyond the animal kingdom to endangered plant species, also protected under
the Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(11) (1976).
47. Record at 21.
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JUSTICE STEWART: And has determined this little fish to be an
endangered species.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Right.
JUSTICE STEWART: It seems-the language of the statute that I
just read aloud for my own information and to refresh your
memory seems to me to be an unambiguous requirement.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Well, that's what the Sixth Circuit
said.
JUSTICE STEWART: Yes, well, isn't that what the words say?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Not to me.
In the first place, I don't-I think you very often say, is a
statute intended to be retroactive? There is a presumption
against retroactive construction of a statute?
This is certainly retroactive. It is being-has been applied
retroactively."
Like Justice Stevens, Justice Stewart adopts a strict interpreta-
tion of the statutory language and thus supports the imposition
of a mandatory duty upon federal agencies to protect endangered
species.
Justice Stewart's only other major remarks relate to Justice
White's inquiry whether the Secretary of Interior's determination
of endangered status for the snail darter is subject to judicial
review.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Right, I know-I'm satisfied you can
review it under the Administrative Procedure Act. But this, the
case-
JUSTICE WHITE: By a suit in a District Court, or by-probably, I
guess.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: I think it would go to the District
Court.
JUSTICE STEWART: But that's not a change; that's just a mainte-
nance of the status quo.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Well, it's a denial of-
JUSTICE STEWART: It's a refusal of the Secretary to change the
status quo.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Right.
JtSTICE STEWART: It's not a change.'
Justice Stewart continues his probe of the reviewability of the
Secretary's determination during Plater's argument,50 and Plater
responds that judicial review of the listing is possible under the
Administrative Procedure Act. Justice Stewart's remarks reveal-
48. Id. at 22-23.
49. Id. at 28.
50. Id. at 36-37.
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ing his strict construction of the Act's language, plus his apparent
attempt to elicit the conclusion that trial court review of the fish's
original listing would be an appropriate method to exempt the
Tellico Project from the Act's mandate, should have made it
quite clear that he would join in a majority opinion committed
to the doctrine of separation of powers and hesitancy to alter the
status quo. Like Justice Stevens, but to a somewhat lesser extent,
Justice Stewart's role is that of plaintiffs' protagonist and
T.V.A.'s antagonist, repeatedly recalling the literal language of
the statute.
Justice Brennan, although not a particularly active ques-
tioner during the argument, does reveal his bias in favor of plain-
tiffs' position, which was subsequently confirmed by his joining
in the majority opinion. For example, in connection with an in-
quiry concerning the relevance of continued congressional appro-
priations for the Tellico Project, and more specifically the $2
million 1978 appropriation, the following exchange takes place:
JUSTICE BRENNAN: Mr. Attorney General, to what agency was
that $2 million appropriated?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: TVA.
JusTIcE BRENNAN: And what is TVA supposed to do with it?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Carry on with their project to trans-
plant the snail darter.
JUSTICE BRENNAN: In other words, to see if they can do something
which will not jeopardize the continued existence of the species.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Right, which they have been doing.
JUSTICE BRENNAN: And if they fail?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Well, they haven't failed. But there's
never been a hearing on that.
JUSTICE BRENNAN: Well, I know. The fact that Congress said,
here's $2 million; see if you can do something about preventing
jeopardy to the continued existence of the species. I would think
that that suggests that Congress intended if they can't, then
they can't go on with the dam.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: I say that Congress is trying to accom-
modate both problems.
JUSTICE BRENNAN: Well, all we know is a one-line appropriation,
I take it, is it?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: That's right, that's it.
Then you know what's in the committee reports. The com-
mittee reports three times in three years have said, go forward.
JUSTICE BRENNAN: Well, I know, but-
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: But it hasn't been in the statute.
JUSTICE BRENNAN: -- did the committee report the statute? If it
came to the President to veto, what would he veto, the commit-
tee report or the statute?
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ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: He'd veto the statute.5 1
Justice Brennan's only other remarks52 appear informational in
content and do not seem to evidence very openly his predisposi-
tion toward plaintiffs' view.
Thus, although his participation is brief, Justice Brennan,
nevertheless, does reveal his position relatively clearly. He seems
to adopt the same strict statutory interpretation approach Jus-
tices Stevens and Stewart advocated concerning T.V.A.'s retroac-
tivity and continued appropriations arguments. His questions re-
lating to the proper congressional forum for exempting legislation
and the absence of any mention of the conflict on the floor of
Congress" remain unanswered by Attorney General Bell. Justice
Brennan, therefore, appears to undermine quite successfully
T.V.A.'s appropriations argument, foreshadowing his vote joining-
in Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion.
. Just as Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Brennan serve as
plaintiffs' protagonists and defendant's antagonists during the
oral argument, Justice Powell clearly plays the opposite role and
subsequently authored the primary dissent. He is silent until
shortly before the conclusion of Attorney General Bell's presenta-
tion. Then, following the barrage of hostile questions described
above relating to the force of the Secretary of Interior's biological
findings, the deficiencies of T.V.A.'s appropriations argument,
and the reviewability of the Secretary's determination of en-
dangered status,5' Justice Powell openly betrays his bias.
51. Id. at 25-27.
52. During the discussion of the Department of Interior's having taken a position
contrary to the Department of Justice and the Tennessee Valley Authority, the following
exchange between Justice Brennan and Attorney General Bell occurred:
JusTicE BRENNAN: Perhaps you may have heard that when Mr. Justice Frank-
furter was here he thought that was just outrageous on behalf of the Solicitor
General to come here and offer us conflicting views of two Cabinet departments.
And he said so.
ArroRNEY GENERAL BELL: I don't favor it myself.
JusTicF BRENNAN: Well, the trouble is that in some instances Congress has
expressly authorized it.
Record at 30.
Later, during Plater's argument, Justice Brennan asks only one question.
JusTicE BRENNAN: Are you suggesting, Mr. Plater, that Congress may finally
decide, we better abandon this whole dam? At least the dam?
Record at 48-49. Although this question may at first glance appear antagonistic toward
Plater, its content reveals it as an attempt to elicit information concerning the steps
Congress is taking to resolve the conflict, which is consistent with his eventual support of
the majority's separation of powers position.
53. The one line lump-sum appropriation bill mentioned by Justice Brennan did not
even mention the Tellico Project.
54. Record at 24-29.
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JUSTICE POWELL: Mr. Attorney General, may I ask you a friendly
question?
Let's assume that in order to resolve this issue, somebody
introduced a bill in Congress saying explicitly that Section 7
shall apply to every completed Federal project in the United
States. Do you think many Congressmen who voted for that
clarification of this statute would be reelected?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: No, but they wouldn't vote for it to
begin with.
JusTIcE POWELL: That's my point. And doesn't that suggest that
nobody, really no one, rationally, could apply this to a com-
pleted project?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: It does to me, and under the Sixth
Circuit holding, it would have to be applied."
Justice Powell continues:
JusTICE POWELL: May I ask you one other, maybe less friendly,
question? You commenced your argument, and I felt for you, by
saying that it was not without precedent for two departments
of the government to come to our Court in an antagonistic posi-
tion.
It's not easy for us to resolve-I speak for myself-it's not
easy for me to resolve issues of vast importance to our country
when two Cabinet-level departments are at swords' point. I won-
der why these things aren't determined at the Cabinet level
rather than submitting them to us.
ATroRNEY GENERAL BELL: You say that's not so friendly. It's a
very friendly question. It gives me an opportunity to say that I
do not favor this system. We have one Attorney General and one
Solicitor General, and I think that ought to be it.
But as long as you can do it, people will ask you to do it.51
Justice Powell was either genuinely seeking an answer to the
question why the Departments of Justice and Interior were at
odds with one another, or he sensed that his fellow Justices would
be disturbed by the difference of positions and wanted to afford
Bell the opportunity to address the point before completing his
argument.
Like his "friendly" attitude toward Attorney General Bell,
Justice Powell's demeanor at the beginning of Plater's argument
seems congenial and even suggests a balanced position, in con-
trast to the role he played earlier in Bell's argument.
JusTIcE POWELL: May I interrupt you right there? Apart from the
55. Id. at 29.
56. Id. at 29-30.
1978]
104 University of Puget Sound Law Review
biological interest, which I say we do not challenge, what pur-
pose is served, if any, by these little darters? Are they used for
food? 7
Plater responds that the fish is not a food fish, but is highly
sensitive to clean, cool, flowing river water and, thus, serves as
an indicator of habitat quality for both non-human and human
species. Revealing his sense of humor, Justice Powell, noting that
he is a bass fisherman, then asks whether they are suitable for
bait, to which Plater replies "no.""8 This apparent congeniality is,
however, short-lived. Justice Powell apparently finally decides
the appropriate time has arrived to probe deeply into plaintiffs'
argument and reveal what he feels are its inadequacies. The fol-
lowing interchange was one of the longest between a single Justice
and advocate. It is reproduced in its entirety to show Justice
Powell at his best as an inquisitor, constantly thrusting and
parrying, not giving Plater the luxury of the lengthy replies he
had enjoyed earlier.
JUSTICE POWEL: May I come back to an argument you were
making a few minutes ago that this dam, after all, is not impor-
tant to what Congress intended. I read a few words from the
Senate Appropriations Committee report last year: the project
will provide needed flood control, water supply, recreational
opportunities, improved navigation.
Now without the dam and the water in it, would any of
those objectives of Congress be attainable?
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, it should be noted that the Appropria-
tions Committee at no time has ever reviewed the GAO study,
the reviews taking place in the other committees, and so on.
It turns out-
JUSTICE POWELL: That wasn't my question.
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, it is true that there would be no flood
control, there would be no electric power in the project-
JUSTICE POWELL: No recreation?
MR. PLATER: No, that is not so, Your Honor. The river is the last
place left in the river system that has high quality water condi-
tions. It's the finest trout stream in the Southeast of the United
States. People come from Alabama, Georgia, and all over to
fish-
JUSTICE POWELL: You've got Mr. Stewart's vote already.
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, it is the last place for flowing water
recreation. And as the GAO noted, because there have been so
many impoundments-
57. Id. at 43.
58. Id. at 44.
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JUSTICE POWELL: Do you think the Senate of the United States,
or the Senate Appropriations Committee, was thinking about
maintaining this stream when it was appropriating money to
close the dam?
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, I believe that the relevant discussion
is in the committee that has lawmaking jurisdiction over the
Act, and they clearly are concerned about recreation; in the
House side as well.
JUSTICE POWELL: Is there any record that the members of that
committee voted against this appropriation?
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, the appropriations bill, on its face,
does not purport to treat Tellico. It says nothing about Tellico.
JUSTICE POWELL: I understand the bill on its face doesn't. But
do you think any rational person could read the reports of the
committee for the last four or five years and conclude that there
was any intention on the part of the Congress other than to
complete this project?
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, I believe that one reading those re-
ports would find clearly and specifically that, indeed, Congress
had no intent to amend the Act. And that is one of the require-
ments for taking an appropriations bill, or an Appropriations
Committee report, and reading out of it an informal, implied
amendment. There must be some indication of an intent to
amend.
As a matter of fact, in 1977, Senator Stennis specifically
said, if we put such an amendment in here, it would be subject
to a point of order. I think Your Honor's question, however,
reflects the fact that certainly the Appropriations Committee,
or certain members of it, probably didn't agree with the En-
dangered Species Act, or wish that it didn't apply in this case.
But there was no intention expressed to amend, and that
is the only basis on which we could use that to change the law.
JUSTICE POWELL: Do you think that reflects any indication on the
part of the Congress not to construe Section 7 as applying to
completed projects?
MR. PLATER: I believe, Your Honor, that the appropriations
bill-as every appropriations bill is passed-presumes that the
agency will comply with all applicable relevant laws. Because
the agencies are creatures of Congress.
JUSTICE POWELL: You apparently didn't hear my question, so I'll
put another one to you.
Do you think-it is still your position, as I understand it,
that this Act, Section 7, applies to completed projects? I know
you don't think it occurs very often that there'll b . a need to
apply it. But does it apply if the need exists?
MR. PLATER: To the continuation-
JUSTICE POWELL: To completed projects. Take the Grand Coulee
dam-
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MR. PLATER: Right, Your Honor, if there were a species there-
JUSTICE POWELL: I'm not asking-
MR. PLATR:-it wouldn't be endangered by the dam.
JUSTICE POWELL: I know that's your view. I'm asking you not to
project your imagination-
MR. PLATER: I see, Your Honor.
JUSICE POWELL: -beyond accepting my assumption.
MR. PLATER: Right.
JUSTICE POWELL: And that was that an endangered species might
turn up at Grand Coulee. Does Section 7 apply to it?
MR. PLATER: I believe it would, Your Honor. The Secretary of
the Interior-
JusTIcE POWELL: That answers my question.
MR. PLATER: Yes, it would. The consequences of that, of course
would-
JUsTICE POWELL: In what respects, Mr. Plater, would it apply?
It would apply only to future action, wouldn't it?
MR. PLATER: Well, Your Honor, as we-
JUSTICE POWELL: It doesn't ever require anybody to tear any-
thing down, does it?
MR. PLATER: It certainly says nothing about that in the Act,
Your Honor. And that's why-
JUSTICE POWELL: It says you can't undertake certain actions in
the future if they're going to extinguish a species. That's what
it says, doesn't it?"'
It seems almost as if Justice Powell were attempting to ready
Plater for the slaughter with his earlier friendly remarks. He re-
veals himself as a shrewd advocate with myriad techniques to
extract what he desires.
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion predictably discloses no
surprises. Much of its language is transparently reminiscent of
the predisposition revealed during oral argument.
The Court today holds that § 7 of the Endangered Species
Act requires a federal court, for the purposes of protecting an
endangered species or its habitat, to enjoin permanently the
operation of any federal project, whether completed or substan-
tially completed. This decision casts a long shadow over the
operation of even the most important projects, serving vital
needs of society and national defense, whenever it is determined
that continued operation would threaten extinction of an endan-
gered species or its habitat. This result is said to be required by
the "plain intent of Congress" as well as by the language of the
statute.
59. Id. at 54-59.
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In my view § 7 cannot reasonably be interpreted as applyingto a project that is completed or substantially completed whenits threat to an endangered species is discovered. Nor can Ibelieve that Congress could have intended this Act to producethe "absurd result"-in the words of the District Court-of thiscase. If it were clear from the language of the Act and its legisla-tive history that Congress intended to authorize this result, thisCourt would be compelled to enforce it. It is not our province torectify policy or political judgments by the Legislative Branch,however egregiously they may disserve the public interest. Butwhere the statutory language and legislative history, as in thiscase, need not be construed to reach such a result, I view it asthe duty of this Court to adopt a permissible construction that
accords with some modicum of common sense and the public
weal. 0
The dissent further notes:
Today the Court, like the Court of Appeals below, adopts areading of § 7 of the Act that gives it a retroactive effect anddisregards 12 years of consistently expressed congressional in-tent to complete the Tellico Project. With all due respect, I viewthis result as an extreme example of a literalist construction, notrequired by the language of the Act and adopted without regardto its manifest purpose. Moreover, it ignores established canons
of statutory construction."'
And further:
The result that will follow in this case by virtue of the Court'sreading of § 7 makes it unreasonable to believe that Congress
intended that reading. Moreover, § 7 may be construed in a waythat avoids an "absurd result" without doing violence to its
language.
The critical word in § 7 is "actions" and its meaning is farfrom "plain." It is part of the phrase: "actions authorized,
funded or carried out." In terms of planning and executing var-ious activities, it seems evident that the "actions" referred toare not all actions that an agency can ever take, but ratheractions that the agency is deciding whether to authorize, tofund, or to carry out. In short, these words reasonably may beread as applying only to prospective actions, i.e., actions withrespect to which the agency has reasonable decisionmaking al-ternatives still available, actions not yet carried out. At the timerespondents brought this lawsuit, the Tellico Project was 80%complete at a cost of more than $78 million. The Court concedes
60. 98 S. Ct. at 2302 (footnote omitted).
61. Id. at 2305 (footnote omitted).
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that as of this time and for the purpose of deciding this case,
the Tellico dam project is "completed" or "virtually completed
and the dam is essentially ready for operation . . . ." Thus,
under a prospective reading of § 7, the action already had been"carried out" in terms of any remaining reasonable decision-
making power. 2
Justice Powell's final predictions follow quite directly as the logi-
cal conclusions of his inquiries at oral argument.
I have little doubt that Congress will amend the Endan-
gered Species Act to prevent the grave consequences made pos-
sible by today's decision. Few, if any, Members of that body will
wish to defend an interpretation of the Act that requires the
waste of at least $53 million, and denies the people of the Ten-
nessee valley area the benefits of the reservoir that Congress
intended to confer. There will be little sentiment to leave this
dam standing before an empty reservoir, serving no purpose
other than a conversation piece for incredulous tourists.
But more farreaching than the adverse effect on the people
of this economically depressed area is the continuing threat to
the operation of every federal project, no matter how important
to the Nation. If Congress acts expeditiously, as may be antici-
pated, the Court's decision probably will have no lasting adverse
consequences. But I had not thought it to be the province of this
Court to force Congress into otherwise unnecessary action by
interpreting a statute to produce a result no one intended. 3
In contrast to Justice Powell, Justice Rehnquist is remarka-
bly inactive as a questioner during the oral argument. With one
exception," his few questions all attack the argument that an
injunction is mandatory if a federal statutory violation is shown.
Early in Attorney General Bell's argument, for example, Justice
Rehnquist hears the term "balancing of equitable factors" and
immediately probes further.
62. Id. at 2306-07.
63. Id. at 2309-10 (footnote omitted).
64. The sole exception to Justice Rehnquist's continued focus upon the equitable
powers issue is surprisingly favorable to plaintiffs' position. After Justice Powell's probing
of the snail darter's practical value, Justice Rehnquist asks:
JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Mr. Plater, isn't it at least an arguable part of the intent of
Congress that the Government simply leaves certain areas of nature alone,
without necessarily having a reason for leaving them alone, but just that they
didn't want any more elimination of species and so forth.
Record at 45-46.
This inquiry seems unusual in light of Justice Rehnquist's other questions. Perhaps
he is merely attempting to terminate this line of questioning concerning species value,
because it is quite clear from the Act that broad species preservation goals, not specific
economic justifications, were contemplated by Congress. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976).
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ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: So that's the issue that is presented,the issue that must be resolved: Can there be a balancing of theequitable factors in deciding whether this action taken in themeaning of the statute can be taken.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST: General, when you say "balancing the equi-table factors," is one of the ways that would be done the decisionof the District Court or the Court of Appeals whether an equita-
ble injunction would issue?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: That's it, yes, sir.65
Later, in Plater's argument, Justice Rehnquist further mani-
fests his feeling that this issue is dispositive of the case. That is,he believes that even if a statutory violation exists, the trial courthad discretion to decide whether or not to issue an injunction
based upon a weighing of all relevant factors.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST: But Hecht against Bowles says you don't get
an injunction automatically for a statutory violation."
Plater then poses the hypothetical of a dam project with a whoop-ing crane population endangered by the impoundment and statesthat, in his opinion, the trial court could not decide the essen-tially legislative question of what should be done with the dam,which would require delving into cost accounting to determinethe dam's true value.67 Justice Rehnquist counters:
JUSTICE REHNQUIST: I don't agree with you Mr. Plater. Becauseyou have a long history of equitable adjudication where, forinstance, a building is built over a lot line, and there has beena contest throughout, but the chancellor doesn't reach a decisionuntil the building is finally built. And he may say, applying thecommon law, which has the same sanction to him as the legisla-tive laws passed by Congress, I will give you damages, I will not
give you an injunction.
Now why isn't this an appropriate case for that sort of an
adjudication?
MR. PLATER: Several reasons; number one is, Your Honor noteddamages of course is not a remedy. Once a species is renderedextinct, as Congress said, it's extinct forever.Secondly, of course, that would be involving private prac-tice under the common law. This Court has repeatedly said thatin cases which involve a Congressional statute, that indeed, theprinciple which guides the Court in the exercise of its discretionis enforcing the law, which has not been set up by common law
but by statute.
65. Record at 11-12.
66. Id. at 51.
67. Id. at 52-53.
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JUSTICE REHNQUIST: It's completely opposite in Hecht against
Bowles.
MR. PLATER: No, Your Honor; we are not arguing that an injunc-
tion must be issued. Under the Hecht case-
JUSTICE REHNQUIST: That is, if there were voluntary compliance,
and an injunction wouldn't be necessary. And that was Hecht
v. Bowles."
Justice Rehnquist's dissent mirrors the trend of his remarks
during oral argument.
In the light of my Brother POWELL's dissenting opinion, I
am far less convinced than is the Court that the Endangered
Sbecies Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq., was intended to
prohibit the completion of the Tellico Dam. But the very diffi-
culty and doubtfulness of the correct answer to this legal ques-
tion convinces me that the Act did not prohibit the District
Court from refusing, in the exercise of its traditional equitable
powers, to enjoin petitioner from completing the Dam.6
He concludes his opinion:
Since the District Court possessed discretion to refuse in-
junctive relief even though it had found a violation of the Act,
the only remaining question is whether this discretion was
abused in denying respondents' prayer for an injunction. The
District Court denied respondents injunctive relief because of
the significant public and social harms that would flow from
such relief and because of the demonstrated good faith of peti-
tioner. As the Court recognizes, such factors traditionally have
played a central role in the decisions of equity courts whether
to deny an injunction.
Since equity is "the instrument for nice adjustment and
reconciliation between the public interest and private needs,"
a decree in one case will seldom be the exact counterpart of a
decree in another. Here, the District Court recognized that Con-
gress when it enacted the Endangered Species Act made the
preservation of the habitat of the snail darter an important pub-
lic concern. But it concluded that this interest on one side of the
balance was more than outweighed by other equally significant
factors. These factors, further elaborated in the dissent of my
Brother POWELL, satisfy me that the District Court's refusal
to issue an injunction was not an abuse of its discretion. I there-
fore dissent from the Court's opinion holding otherwise.70
68. Id. at 53-54.
69. 98 S. Ct. at 2310.
70. Id. at 2311 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 2:89
Judicial Predictability
Justice Rehnquist's position is, therefore, quite predictable. Heidentifies one issue as the crux of the controversy, probes thatissue, openly exposes his bias, and subsequently authors a dis-senting opinion based precisely upon that point.Although at the actual oral argument, Justices Stevens,Stewart, and Brennan seemed clearly to favor plaintiffs' positionand Justices Powell and Rehnquist appeared openly to supportthe Tennessee Valley Authority, which impressions were subse-quently confirmed by the majority and dissenting opinions, Jus-tices Blackmun and White seemed more equivocal in their atti-tudes toward the controversy. Examination of the record, how-ever, portrays a somewhat clearer indication of their predisposi-
tions.
Although an exchange between Justice Blackmun and Belllate in the argument appears to reveal the Justice's support of thegovernment's position, Justice Blackmun's earlier questions toBell and Plater do not significantly unmask his bias. For in-stance, requesting further information, the Justice at an earlypoint questions Bell:
JUSTICE BLACKMUN: Attorney General Bell, there is something inthe briefs about efforts at transplantation. And I wondered, canyou bring us up to date on that? Have they been successful? Andsecondly I would like to know whether the construction alreadydone to the dam has so endangered the species that it is not
going to survive anyway. 7'
Later, at the onset of plaintiff-respondents' argument, JusticeBlackmun attacks Plater for his characterization of the Sixth
Circuit decision as "unanimous."
JUSTICE BLACKMUN: Mr. Plater, Judge McCree did write sepa-rately below, didn't he? Do you feel that he was, however, join-
ing the majority opinion?
MR. PLATER: Yes, Your Honor. Judge McCree below said thathe concurred with the result of the Court's opinion; the fact,also, that indeed the TVA project must be enjoined because itwould eliminate the species from the face of the Earth.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN: Well, many times when we appear particu-larly to concur in the result, it means we think the majorityopinion was rather poor, and we have reasons of our own.
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, I don't want to second guess Judge
McCree, but it might be noted-
JUSTICE BLACKMUN: Well, you said it was a unanimous opinion.
It may be a unanimous judgment, but I wanted to-
71. Record at 7-8.
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MR. PLATER: Unanimous position taken by the Sixth Circuit
that this project should be enjoined. Thank you, Your Honor.7"
Whether Justice Blackmun was in fact evidencing hostility to
plaintiffs' position or merely demanding precise use of language
was unclear in plaintiffs' minds at the time.
The apparent feelings underlying some of Justice Black-
mun's questions to Bell, however, should have alerted plaintiffs
to his support of T.V.A.'s position. For example, when the Attor-
ney General has difficulty answering Justice White's inquiry as
to whether the government's position is that there is no violation
of the Act or that there is a violation, but an injunction should
not issue,7 3 Justice Blackmun plays the same role for Bell that
Justice Stevens played for Plater, attempting to aid him in his
presentation.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN: Mr. Attorney General Bell, I understood
your principal argument to be that the statute could not fairly
be construed to apply to a project that was either completed or
substantially completed.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Well, but that would be like-now if
a court has jurisdiction, Bell v. Hood, you have to have a hearing
to find out if you have jurisdiction. You'd have to have a hearing
to see if the statute could be read as applying to these particular
facts.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN: I understand you'd have to have a hearing.
But if the facts were simply this, that the main dam in the
Tennessee Valley is completed-nobody argues that it is not
completed, it's been 30 or 40 years.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Right.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN: Suppose they found a snail darter down in
that lake tomorrow. The Secretary of the Interior claims you
must remove the dam.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: That's exactly right.
JusTICE BLACKMUN: Now do you think the statute applies to
that?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Well, I don't think the statute can be
applied to that.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN: Do you think it could be construed reasona-
bly to think that the Congress of the United States would re-
quire that that dam be removed?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: I do not. That would be a completed
project, farther than our case.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN: My question was addressed to a completed
72. Id. at 34.
73. See text accompanying note 82 infra for Justice White's questions on this point.
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project or one substantially completed. And you told us that at
the beginning of this argument that all that was necessary to be
done was to close the gate.
ATrORNEY GENERAL BELL: Close the gate plus-that's the dam.
Now, there are roads to be completed. There's a little-there's
a million point-$1.3 million in the '79 budget, but that's to
complete some roads and bridges.
The dam itself is finished. All the landscaping has been
done and that sort of thing. So it is completed.
But I've not argued that it's the sort of thing, say, where aroad has been finished, and five years later they found some-
thing there, an endangered species, and they say, would they
remove the road.
Here, a good example would be if they found a plant grow-
ing on the bank of this lake. Sometimes when they had the waterdown during the winter time, they'd lower the water five feet,
and they found this plant. And they say, you never raise thewater back up; because there's still action to be taken. There
was a little action left to be taken here.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN: A tiny, little bit?
ATrORNEY GENERAL BELL: A little, just very little, but a little.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN: How much money has the Government
spent on this project?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: $110 million.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN: $110 million. The government has appropri-
ated $2 million to transplant these darters.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: I hadn't gotten to that.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN: Very important."
This exchange clearly reveals Justice Blackmun's support of
T.V.A.'s argument concerning retroactivity based upon implied
congressional intent, and his attachment of importance to the
funds already spent on the project and the $2 million appropria-
tion for current transplantation efforts. Thus, although Justice
Blackmun's position was not readily apparent to plaintiffs during
oral argument, perhaps because of the few times he engaged in
questioning and their being spread throughout the argument, re-
examination of his remarks makes it reasonably unsurprising that
he joined in Justice Powell's dissenting opinion, which focused
upon T.V.A.'s arguments concerning retroactivity, continued
appropriations, and amount of money spent on, or stage of com-
pletion of, the project. 5
Like Justice Blackmun, Justice White seemed somewhat ofan enigma during the actual hearing. Analysis of the record of
74. Record at 17-19.
75. See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
1978]
University of Puget Sound Law Review
proceedings discloses little of his underlying attitude toward the
case. It does, however, reveal him as relishing several opportuni-
ties to vent his feelings against both advocates and being primar-
ily interested in a resolution that would relieve the Supreme
Court from playing any significant role in the dispute, which may
be predictive of his eventual position. Twice during Bell's argu-
ment, for example, he emphatically corrects a point the Attorney
General has made or an impression he has conveyed. Thus, in,
response to Bell's early recounting of the alleged success of the
T.V.A. transplantation program, a characterization clearly open
to question,76 Justice White notes:
JUSTICE WHITE: You say this is in the-it's not in the record in
this case.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Some of it's in the record-not the
success story. It's in public documents that were filed with the
Secretary when they tried to take the-there's a petition filed
to take the snails-
JUSTICE WHITE: Of course, everything in these documents may
not be true.77
Similarly, after Bell expresses his opinion that the government
should speak only through the Attorney General, notes that op-
posing positions among cabinet level officers are most unusual in
federal litigation, and states in reference to this case that "[i]t's
the only time we've done it since I've been Attorney General,"'7
Justice White interjects:
JUSTICE WHITE: Mr. Attorney General, with regard to your state-
ment a moment ago about other agencies of the Government
taking their own position here contrary to what the Solicitor
General might be, I indicated that Congress has expressly au-
thorized it in some instances.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Right.
JUSTICE WHITE: And I just suggested that this afternoon or to-
morrow we're hearing a case in which the Federal Communica-
tions Commission is taking a position flatly contrary to the De-
partment of Justice on a case. It's not a rarity.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: The Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion does it. But those are by statute. This is not a statute.
JUSTICE WHITE: Okay, exactly, right. 7'
76. See, e.g., Brief For Respondents at 17, T.V.A. v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978);
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY AND U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ALTERNATIVES FOR COMPLETING
THE TELLiCO PROJECT 5 (draft report, August 10, 1978).
77. Record at 8.
78. Id. at 31.
79. Id. at 32-33.
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In plaintiff-respondents' argument, Justice White again
vents his feelings. Thus, after Plater summarizes plaintiffs' posi-
tion as his argument time expires, Justice White apparently feels
a need to conclude the hearing by expressing his attitude that the
resolution of the case is by no means clear in his mind.
JUSTICE WHITE: Well, I understand what your position is and
what the law means. But if somebody happened to disagree with
you as to how to construe the Act, it might be that the agency
isn't violating the law at all.
Your argument is what the law means.
MR. PLATER: Only TVA is making that argument.
JUSTICE WHITE: Nevertheless, your statement is absolutely in-
correct unless the Act is construed the way you say it should be
construed.
MR. PLATER: Yes, Your Honor, if this Act is discretionary the
way the old law was written, if this Act doesn't mean what it
says, then, indeed, this-
JUSTICE WHITE: But one of the issues in the case is, what does
the Act mean.
MR. PLATER: The regulations of the Department of the Interior;
every holding in the case so far-
JUSTICE WHITE: I understand. You're arguing that it should be
construed in a certain way. But some other people disagree with
you.
MR. PLATER: They do.
Thank you, Your Honors °
With the exception of these attempts by Justice White to
correct inaccuracies in the presentations, his remarks seem aimed
at understanding Bell's argument and at developing a way for the
Court to avoid deciding the substantive issues presented by the
case. Thus, before Justice Blackmun attempts to help Bell restate
the government position as to whether there is no statutory viola-
tion or whether there is a violation conceded but a contention that
an injunction is inappropriate,8 Justice White prods the Attorney
General to make his views more clear.
JUSTICE WHITE: So on any of the grounds that you are suggesting,
you're suggesting that the statute itself be construed so that
there's no violation here if these gates are closed?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: That's it.
JUSTICE WHITE: There's no violation of the statute at all?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Right.
80. Id. at 62.
81. See text accompanying notes 73 and 74 supra.
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JUSTICE WHITE: And although the statute applies, you construe
the statute based on various facts.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: The balance in the factors-I would
say it applies.
JUSTICE WHITE: Your argument isn't that it's a violation of the
statute, but an injunction isn't authorized.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: That's it.
JUSTICE WHITE: That isn't your argument, is it?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: That is my argument.
JUSTICE WHITE: You don't concede there's a violation of the stat-
ute, though.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: No, not unless-
JUSTICE WHITE: You construe the statute so that closing the
gates wouldn't violate the statute?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: That would prevent there being a vio-
lation. The factors, the facts, taken as a whole, would prevent
there being a violation of the statute.
I don't concede-I concede the statute applies; though. I
think it does apply.2
This line of questioning appears to be a genuine attempt to un-
derstand Bell's position and does not seem to disclose a particular
predisposition on Justice White's part.
More obvious betrayals of Justice White's attitude appear in
his inquiries relating to the possibility of remanding the matter
to the district court. He clearly feels the record is deficient in
information concerning transplantation success and recent con-
gressional appropriations. He further believes the Secretary of
Interior's refusal to remove the snail darter from endangered
status may be reviewable by the trial court, which would also
enable the Supreme Court to avoid rendering a substantive
decision at this point.
JUSTICE WHITE: Well, Mr. Attorney General, why shouldn't
there-why shouldn't the Court remand this case to have the
record brought up to date?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Well, I-
JUSTICE WHITE: A lot of things have happened since the Court
of Appeals decided it.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: That's exactly right.
And you might well want to do that. I think that the Sixth
Circuit is in error.
JUSTICE WHITE: Well has anybody-is the Secretary's refusal to
remove the fish from the list-he's done that in the last two or
three months, you say. Or is it the habitat?
82. Record at 16-17.
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ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Well, he didn't have a hearing on it.
JUSTICE WHITE: Well, he refused, though, didn't he?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: He refused.
JUSTICE WHITE: Is that subject to judicial review?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: I don't know.
JUSTICE WHITE: If it is, is it-has review been sought?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: I think it could be-I think you could
have a review on denial of due process, to begin with, if you
couldn't get a hearing.
JUSTICE WHITE: Well, I know, but is the Secretary-you just
don't know whether there are procedures to secure review of the
Secretary's refusal to remove the snail darters-s
Justice White's questions and comments disclose little about
his position on the substance of the controversy. He clearly pre-
fers that the Court not deal with the controversy at this point, but
either remand for further fact-finding, or require T.V.A. to seek
judicial review of Interior's refusal to remove the fish from the
endangered species list. He, nevertheless, joins in the majority
opinion upholding the enjoining of the project's completion. One
can only speculate that he may have been convinced by Justices
Stevens's and Stewart's arguments that a violation exists, and
therefore, an injunction is appropriate, the uncertainty of the
transplantation efforts and appropriations notwithstanding. It
may be that Justice White eventually viewed plaintiffs' argument
as a compromise relieving the Supreme Court from affirmative
decision-making responsibility. That is, plaintiffs did not argue
the dam should never be closed, but only that, given a specific
statutory violation, a decision to exempt a federal agency from
the statute's operation based upon a weighing of costs and bene-
fits was a legislative, not a judicial, function. The majority opin-
ion adopts this separation of power reasoning and actually pre-
serves the status quo. It requires the Supreme Court to take no
action and leaves the injunction in effect until Congress exempts
the project or the Secretary removes the fish's endangered status.
Perhaps Justice White felt more comfortable with this outcome
than with the dissents' arguments for reversal. The majority opin-
ion is, at very least, analogous to his view favoring involving the
Court as little as possible.
Earlier discussion in this article concluded that the eventual
positions taken by Justices Stevens, Stewart, Brennan, Powell,
and Rehnquist are readily predictable based upon examination of
their questions and comments during oral argument. It was fur-
83. Id. at 27-28.
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ther noted that, whereas Justices Blackmun and White may have
appeared more equivocal at the actual hearing, closer analysis of
the record reveals their later positions as being reasonably pre-
dictable. The remarks of Justices Marshall and Burger, however,
even after re-examination of the transcript, remain perplexing in
contrast to the positions they ultimately adopted supporting
plaintiffs' argument.
Throughout the argument, Justice Marshall appears hostile
toward plaintiffs and appears to treat the snail darter's plight as
frivolous. During Attorney General Bell's argument, for example,
he asks:
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Mr. Attorney General, what would happen
if they found snail darters in the basement of this building?
Would they tear the building down, this building?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: I don't know; you'd have to ask the
Sixth Circuit that. I think they'd enjoin you from functioning if
they found it to be a critical habitat.'
Later, Justice Marshall returns to this analogy:
MR. PLATER: [Alfter 68 dams through the TVA river system,
68 of them, one after the other, the range of the snail darter has
apparently been destroyed, one by one, until this last 33 river
miles is the last place on Earth where the species, and human
beings as well, have the quality of the habitat.
JUSTICE POWELL: So that's the last place it's been discovered, I
take it?
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, TVA has looked everywhere for snail
darters.
[Laughter.]
JUSTICE MARSHALL: They haven't searched the basement of our
building yet; that's what I'm worried about.
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, if snail darters were in the basement
of this building, then I suspect they would not be in danger.
They would have found them, Your Honor, and there would be
a bounty on the snail darters' heads8
Whether Justice Marshall is merely displaying his sense of humor
or exposing a feeling that plaintiffs' lawsuit is trivial in nature is
difficult to discern from these questions alone. Later comments,
however, seem to reveal Justice Marshall's hostility to plaintiffs'
case more clearly.
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Suppose you found snail darters around
Chickamauga Dam on the TVA, what would you do?
84. Id. at 23.
85. Id. at 44.
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MR. PLATER: Your Honor, that is a question also like the ques-
tion asked by Mr. Justice Powell. And the point is, biologists tell
us that if you could find a species in a completed project, that
would be a biological indication that that population was not
endangered by the dam, because, indeed, it was living there,
established there, and breeding, and of course, no completed
dam would have to be taken down.
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, suppose the Department of the Interior
said it was?
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, the Department of the Interior-
JusTIcE MARSHALL: You'd have to tear Chickamauga Dam down.
MR. PLATER: No, Your Honor, all they have is biological author-
ity to assert that the endangered species is there, and is threat-
ened by the present circumstances.
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, suppose they say that?
MR. PLATER: Well, Your Honor-
JUSTICE MARSHALL: And they're wrong?
MR. PLATER: If they're wrong, then this answers a question posed
also by Mr. Justice White. There are proceedings currently un-
derway in District Court in Tennessee challenging another list-
ing of an endangered species, arguing that the Department of
the Interior is wrong.
That is the way to do it. The biological opinion of the Secre-
tary, once established, is established, and is not to be over-
turned by lawyers trying to debate biology."8
Justice Marshall is similarly antagonistic later in plaintiffs' argu-
ment when Plater refers to information not in the record.
MR. PLATER: Congress, indeed, is saying that although we've
lost, not $120 million, but something far less than half of that,
the value of the remainder may be several times greater than the
purported claims for the dam.
That is to say, Congress is reviewing it, and I'm pleased to
announce that the agencies are reviewing it as well. In the reply
brief of TVA, it is noted that the new director of TVA has agreed
that the dam is not integral to this project. The project has
benefits which can be achieved as well or better without the
destruction of the valley by a reservoir. And secondly, I was
informed just today, Your Honors, that the Secretary of the
Interior has requested-
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, just speaking for myself, I'm not inter-
ested in what you discovered today. I've got a record here.
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, our case is fully sufficient on the
record. It shows that there is a violation, it shows that Congress,
86. Id. at 35-36.
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in the law-making committees, is considering exactly the ques-
tion Your Honor-
JUSTICE MARSHALL: But doesn't the record also show that this
dam was not for hydraulic purposes?
MR. PLATER: That's exactly right, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Why don't you say that instead of what you
were told today? Because that's in the record.87
Once again, it is difficult to arrive at a comfortable conclusion as
to whether Justice Marshall is genuinely hostile toward plaintiffs
or merely opposed to the Court's considering events not in the
written record.
In retrospect, despite the negativism he seems to display
toward Plater, perhaps Justice Marshall was tactfully attempting
to force Plater to present the best possible case and help him
avoid diminishing the credibility of plaintiffs' argument through
interjection of information not in the record. Although this cer-
tainly did not seem to plaintiffs to be the Justice's purpose at the
time of actual questioning, one inquiry late in Plater's presenta-
tion does vaguely suggest a predisposition on the part of Justice
Marshall toward helping Plater refine his position. Justice Powell
has asked Plater whether discovery of an endangered species in
the reservoir behind the Grand Coulee Dam would require tearing
down the dam.
MR. PLATER: If that situation would arise, Your Honor, it would
probably be a biological rarity, in the sense that if the species
comes when the water goes up and down, then it's established
that it's not endangered.
Maybe the way to answer this is on the basis of the adminis-
trative record. Because in the hearings last summer, the Culver
hearings in the Senate, it was again and again noted that the
biological expertise of the Department of the Interior is capable
of handling many sophisticated such questions. And there has
never been a case that could not be resolved through good faith
and administrative consultation. There have been 4,500 poten-
tial conflicts. There have been hundreds of actual conflicts. But
only TVA testified that the Act was unworkable. Every other
administrative agency said that, although the Act was some-
times a bother, that they could resolve those conflicts.
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Getting back to-why don't you rely on the
fact that even though a facility is all built, if you knew about it
when you started building-isn't that what you say?
87. Id. at 49-50.
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MR. PLATER: That was the situation in this case, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARSHALL: That's what I mean.8
Thus, at this late point in the hearing, Justice Marshall almost
appears to play the same helpful role for Plater as Justice Stevens
played earlier and as Justice Powell did for Bell. His position,
however, is by no means clear.
Justice Marshall's only other major comments parallel Jus-
tice White's inclination to remand the case for further fact-
finding on the transplantation issue. Justice Marshall's com-
ments once again appear hostile toward Plater, and some of his
remarks again seem to treat the matter as frivolous.
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Do we know the facts right now? Do we know
how many snail darters are there?
MR. PLATER: We know approximately, Your Honor. And this
is-
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, how many have been removed?
MR. PLATER: In the present case, Your Honor, we do not have a
full record on the transplantation. But-
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Do we need that? Don't we need that?
Suppose where they're now living, they are six and eight inches
long, and just having a ball. Would you all-
[Laughter.]
JUSTICE MARSHALL: -would your argument be the same?
MR. PLATER: Your Honor-
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Would your argument be the same?
MR. PLATER: No, Your Honor, it would not be, if the Secretary
of the Interior-
JUSTICE MARSHALL: You wouldn't have any argument, would
you?
MR. PLATER: Your Honor-
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Shouldn't we find that out?
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, if the Secretary of the Interior changes
the listing of the species and the critical habitat, then clearly
this case is no longer-
JUSTICE MARSHALL: That was not my question.
MR. PLATER: Excuse me, I misunderstood.
JUSTICE MARSHALL: My question was: Should we know what the
transplanted snail darters, how they're faring? Shouldn't we
know that before we decide this case?
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, the situation-
JUSTICE MARSHALL: I'm not talking about the Secretary of the
Interior; I'm talking about us.
MR. PLATER: All right. Your Honor, the factual situation pre-
88. Id. at 59-60.
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sented in our brief is up to date as well as is known by anyone.
And that is this situation.
TVA claims that approximately 2,000 fish now exist in the
Hiwassee. But as they revealed in the Senate hearings, and
noted at footnote 26 in our brief-
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, then, how can we-you're now getting
ready to say that what they say is not true.
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, that is based-
JUSTICE MARSHALL: How can we know what's true?
MR. PLATER: Because-
JUSTICE MARSHALL: We're not a fact finding body.
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, that's correct. The TVA's biological
data perhaps is determinative here. In December of last year,
they did transects in the Hiwassee River, and they revealed, out
of 710 fish that were put in, 5 fish left in the transects on the
original shoals, and I believe it was 9 juveniles near the flowage
of the Ocoee River. That is the latest scientific evidence on how
many fish are in the Hiwassee.
TVA therefore concluded that the transplant-
JUSTICE MARSHALL: If I may correct you, that's the latest scien-
tific evidence that you know about.
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, I've checked the records of the Secre-
tary of Interior.
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, I mean, suppose there are some other
records available. Do you seriously object to this going back?
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, there may be reasons for this case to
be remanded. However, transplantation is not a fulfillment of
the Act, and therefore, that would be an incidental inquiry.,
Perhaps the author misinterpreted Justice Marshall's re-
marks throughout the actual argument. On their face, they cer-
tainly appear unfriendly toward plaintiffs' position, though a few
of them might be characterized as attempts to help Plater struc-
ture his answers more precisely. If Justice Marshall was princi-
pally disposed toward remanding the case, then one can speculate
that he might have eventually been convinced to join the majority
for the same reasons Justice White may have done so-as a com-
promise position that would relieve the Court from rendering a
decision on the merits. Justice Marshall, however, more so than
Justice White, seems genuinely interested in learning more about
the transplantation success and obviously views it as significant.
His support of a remand appears less than Justice White's to be
based upon general notions of Supreme Court nonintervention.
He may, nevertheless, have been influenced by the Stevens-
89. Id. at 39-41.
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Stewart literal interpretation of the statute and may have viewed
his not joining the majority as a vote numerically threatening an
outright reversal, which he probably did not favor. Despite these
possible explanations, his judicial behavior and eventual position
joining in the majority view remain somewhat bewildering.
While Justice Marshall's comments and subsequent position
present at least an arguably reconcilable pattern, Chief Justice
Burger's remarks and majority opinion manifest a total paradox.
Among the nine members of the Court, it is his position that is
clearly the least predictable and, therefore, the most perplexing.
In the record, the Chief Justice appears consistently opposed to
plaintiffs' arguments and supportive of T.V.A.'s arguments con-
cerning the issues of retroactivity, congressional appropriations,
effect of amount of funds expended, transplantation, and equita-
ble powers. His majority opinion is totally contrary to these atti-
tudes.
For example, after Attorney General Bell states his position
that to enjoin the project's completion would be an impermissible
retroactive application of the 1973 Act, the Chief Justice immedi-
ately attempts to help Bell by rephrasing T.V.A.'s position more
persuasively. In so doing, he also betrays his attachment of signif-
icance to the amount of public funds already spent on the project.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: What you're saying, I take it, is that the
Endangered Species Act is not to be applied, was not intended
by Congress to be applied, to projects that were already under-
way.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Well, I think it does apply-no, I'm
not saying it doesn't apply. It does apply, but then you consider
what stage of development is the project in. What are the rea-
sonable alternatives? Could you change it? Could you change
the design?
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Is one of the factors to be weighed the
fact that $120 million has been spent-
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Exactly.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: -at this point.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: That would be one, and the District
judge weighed that. 0
Later, during Plater's argument, Chief Justice Burger again ex-
poses his feelings concerning the dollars expended. Plater is being
questioned on the practical worth of the snail darter, and Justice
Rehnquist has noted that Congress may have had as its purpose
in enacting the statute the preservation of species and conserva-
90. Id. at 14.
1978]
124 University of Puget Sound Law Review
tion of areas of nature as ends in themselves, regardless of proven
specific values. Plater replies, followed by the Chief Justice:
MR. PLATER: The Devil's Hole Pupfish case, which this Court
decided, was such a case, where there was one small area that
was made into a reserve. This Court unanimously upheld that
reservation.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We weren't faced with the conflict be-
tween the pupfish and a $120 million dam, though.9'
Further on the issue of the Act's application to projects already
constructed, Chief Justice Burger asks:
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Let me pursue a question that Mr. Jus-
tice Marshall put to you. Suppose that you have a $3 or $400
million dam-I don't know the value of the-the cost of the one
he mentioned-and you are confronted with a showing that orig-
inally there were 300,000 of a particular species, and now by the
operation of the dam over a period of years, it's down to 10,000,
and it's about to become extinct.
Are you suggesting that Congress intended that that dam
should be torn down?
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, that of course is not this case-
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Well, I know; I'm asking you hypotheti-
cal questions, to test your argument. As we did with the Attor-
ney General.
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, the question is whether there is a
remaining prospective Federal action which will jeopardize a
species. It's clear under the Act that the Agency does have a
statutory duty to take measures to try to conserve the existence
of the darter.
But the question of whether, in a situation where there are
no Federal actions remaining, nevertheless-
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: The Federal action is the continuance of
the dam.
MR. PLATER: In that situation, Your Honor, that is certainly a
question that would have to be raised. We do not take a position
on that argument.2
Last, near the completion of Plater's argument, after Justice
Marshall comments that plaintiffs should rely on the point that
even if a facility is totally completed, knowledge of the existence
of an endangered species might be significant, Chief Justice
Burger returns to the retroactivity issue:
91. Id. at 46.
92. Id. at 37-38. Justice Powell later forces Plater to take a position on this issue. See
text accomanying note 59 supra. Plater answers that the Act would apply to a completed
project-a position he perhaps need not have taken.
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Well, then this litigation-when this liti-
gation first began to block the development of the project, there
was no snail darter problem involved, was there?
MR. PLATER: The NEPA suit, Your Honor, which was filed in
1971, noted that there possibly were endangered species in the
river. TVA had notice. But at that time, of course, Your Honor,
it was the old Act, which allowed the TVA to have the discre-
tionary flexibility that they're now trying to read into this Act,
applied.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: When the snail darter was discovered,
and became a handy handle to hold onto.
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, the question of the snail darter clearly
went specifically to the qualities of this habitat, that as you
suggest, the citizens have been concerned about for years; that
is to say, the last free flowing clear such big river left in this
region.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: I'm sure that they just don't want this
project, for a combination of reasons.
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, there are a combination of plaintiffs
in this case, many with different points of view. 3
Thus, the Chief Justice also exposes his quite hostile feeling that
the plaintiffs are opportunists who in some way acted almost
unethically in filing the lawsuit.
It is bewildering to examine Chief Justice Burger's majority
opinion references to the alleged retroactive application of the
statute after reviewing his comments on that issue made during
oral argument. Consider the following excerpt:
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision
whose terms were any plainer than those in § 7 of the Endan-
gered Species Act. Its very words affirmatively command all
federal agencies "to insure that actions authorized, funded, or
carried out by them to not jeopardize the continued existence"
of an endangered species or "result in the destruction or modifi-
cation of habitat of such species . . . ." 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
(Emphasis added.) This language admits of no exception. None-
theless, petitioner urges, as do the dissenters, that the Act can-
not reasonably be interpreted as applying to a federal project
which was well under way when Congress passed the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973. To sustain that position, however, we
would be forced to ignore the ordinary meaning of plain lan-
guage."
Similarly, after a lengthy discussion of the legislative history of
the 1973 Act, the Chief Justice notes:
93. Record at 60-61.
94. 98 S. Ct. at 2291.
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It is against this legislative background that we must mea-
sure TVA's claim that the Act was not intended to stop opera-
tion of a project which, like Tellico Dam, was near completion
when an endangered species was discovered in its path. While
there is no discussion in the legislative history of precisely this
problem, the totality of congressional action makes it abun-
dantly clear that the result we reach today is wholly in accord
with both the words of the statute and the intent of Congress.
The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt
and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the
cost. This is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act,
but in literally every section of the statute."
And once again:
Furthermore, it is clear Congress foresaw that § 7 would, on
occasion, require agencies to alter ongoing projects in order to
fulfill the goals of the Act."
Chief Justice Burger then specifically attacks Justice Powell's
argument that the majority decision gives retroactive effect to the
statute.
Mr. Justice POWELL characterizes the result reached here
as giving "retroactive" effect to the Endangered Species Act of
1973. We cannot accept that contention. Our holding merely
gives effect to the plain words of the statute, namely that § 7
affects all projects which remain to be authorized, funded, or
carried out. Indeed, under the Act there could be no"retroactive" application since, by definition, any prior action
of a federal agency which would have come under the scope of
the Act must have already resulted in the destruction of an
endangered species or its critical habitat. In that circumstance
the species would have already been extirpated or its habitat
destroyed; the Act would then have no subject matter to which
it might apply.17
These statements are, at very least, surprising given the trend
evident in Chief Justice Burger's questions concerning applica-
tion of the Act to a project already substantially completed.
Similarly, the Chief Justice's apparent concern for the mil-
lions of dollars spent on the Tellico Project cannot easily be recon-
ciled with the following statement from his opinion:
Concededly, this view of the Act will produce results requir-
ing the sacrifice of the anticipated benefits of the project and of
95. Id. at 2296-97 (footnote omitted).
96. Id. at 2297 (footnote omitted).
97. Id. at 2297-98 n.32.
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many millions of dollars in public funds. But examination of the
language, history and structure of the legislation under review
here indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered
species to be afforded the highest of priorities.1
It should be noted, however, that a footnote to the preceding
statement did indicate that:
The District Court determined that failure to complete the Tel-
lico Dam would result in the loss of some $53 million in nonre-
coverable obligations . . . . Respondents dispute this figure,
and point to a recent study by the General Accounting Office,
which suggests that the figure could be considerably less ...
The GAO study also concludes that TVA and Congress should
explore alternatives to impoundment of the reservoir, such as
the creation of a regional development program based on a free-
flowing river. None of these considerations are relevant to our
decision, however; they are properly addressed to the Executive
and Congress."
Perhaps, then, the Chief Justice remained greatly concerned with
the amount of federal funds expended but was convinced this
issue was more appropriately addressed to the legislative or exec-
utive branch.
As with the retroactivity issue, the Chief Justice's comments
at the hearing concerning the effect of continued congressional
appropriations do not seem reconcilable with the portions of his
opinion addressing that issue.
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: In the 1977 appropriations act, they
actually appropriated $2 million to transplant the snail darter.
That was-I view that as a consultation by Congress. Not only
by the agency, the Congress got into it and tried to resolve the
problem.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Well, three times this project and the
snail darter problem has been called to the attention of the
Congress, has it not?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: It has been everytime they said, go
forward.1N
Once again, on the question of appropriations:
JUSTW.E BRENNAN: If it came to the President to veto, what would
he veto, the committee report or the statute?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: He'd veto the statute.
And he couldn't-
98. Id. at 2291-92 (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at 2291-92 n.19.
100. Record at 19-20.
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: He could veto the appropriations, could
he not, and stop the project, anytime since 1975?
ArrORNEY GENERAL BELL: Right. He has not done that. He has
put it in the 1978 budget.'0 '
These comments hardly seem in accord with the majority opin-
ion's handling of the issue. Consider these excerpts:
There is nothing in the appropriations measure, as passed,
which state that the Tellico Project was to be completed ir-
respective of the requirements of the Endangered Species Act.
These appropriations, in fact, represented relatively minor com-
ponents of the lump sum amounts for the entire TVA budget.
To find a repeal of the Endangered Species Act under these
circumstances would surely do violence to the "cardinal rule
. . . that repeals by implication are not favored."
. . . [T]he policy applies with even greater force when the
claimed repeal rests solely on an appropriations act. We recog-
nize that both substantive enactments and appropriations mea-
sures are "acts of Congress," but the latter have the limited and
specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs.
When voting on appropriations measures, legislators are enti-
tled to operate under the assumption that the funds will be
devoted to purposes which are lawful and not for any purpose
forbidden. Without such an assurance, every appropriations
measure would be pregnant with prospects of altering substan-
tive legislation, repealing by implication any prior statute which
might prohibit the expenditure. Not only would this lead to the
absurd result of requiring Members to review exhaustively the
background of every authorization before voting on an appropri-
ation, but it would flout the very rules the Congress carefully
adopted to avoid this need.102
The Chief Justice continues:
Expressions of committees dealing with requests for appropria-
tions cannot be equated with statutes enacted by Congress, par-
ticularly not in the circumstances presented by this case. First,
the appropriations committees had no jurisdiction over the sub-
ject of endangered species, much less did they conduct the type
of extensive hearings which preceded passage of the earlier en-
dangered species acts, especially the 1973 Act. We venture to
suggest that the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries and the Senate Committee on Commerce would be
somewhat surprised to learn that their careful work on the sub-
stantive legislation had been undone by the simple-and
101. Id. at 27.
102. 98 S. Ct. at 2299-300 (footnote omitted).
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brief-insertion of some inconsistent language in appropriations
committees' reports.
Second, there is no indication that Congress as a whole was
aware of TVA's position, although the appropriations commit-
tees apparently agreed with petitioner's view.103
The juxtaposition of these quite divergent treatments of the ap-
propriations issue poignantly manifests the unpredictability of
Chief Justice Burger's position.
The Chief Justice's apparent view during oral argument,
later expressed by Justice Rehnquist's dissent, that the tradi-
tional equitable powers of the trial court permit the judge to
balance such factors as benefits, costs, stage of completion, and
the like, is equally perplexing. His remarks to Plater suggest
strong support for T.V.A.'s position, but his opinion indicates
otherwisc.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Well, let me put another question to you
that I think is in addition to that. You haven't discussed it yet,
and you don't have much time left.
Do you suggest that any of the legislation passed here has
abrogated the normal equity function of a United States District
Judge in granting an injunction, the very extraordinary relief
that is sought here-
MR. PLATER: Not at all, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: -that-are you suggesting that he
should not function as he does with any other application for an
injunction?
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, that question is an important one. We
do not advocate the stripping of this Court or any court of the
equitable powers. And indeed, Your Honor, we rely on Your
Honors' decision in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corporation, and
that is to say, the equity courts have the full panoply of powers
required to enforce the laws of Congress.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST: But Hecht against Bowles says you don't get
an injunction automatically for a statutory violation.
MR. PLATER: That's correct, Your Honor. And we do not insist
on an injunction. If petitioner agreed to obey the law voluntar-
ily, as the Hecht Corporation did in that case, or as the Mosinee
Paper Corporation agreed in Your Honor's case-
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Then you don't need an injunction?
MR. PLATER: That's precisely right.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: It's academic.
MR. PLATER: And the law would be complied with.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: But this question that I'm putting to you
103. Id. at 2300.
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is, should not the District Court, confronted with an application
to enjoin the operation of a dam in which $122 million worth of
money, one way or the other has been invested-
MR. PLATER: 110, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: 110? All right. $110 million has been
invested-exercise the ordinary functions of an equity judge
weighing and balancing the equities.
MR. PLATER: Let me-yes, Your Honor, it seems to me that the
Court does have equitable discretion. Let me describe, how-
ever-
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: And that includes the equitable discre-
tion not to enforce the statute?
MR. PLATER: No, Your Honor, it does not.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: You think it does not.'0 4
Consider now the Chief Justice's statements dealing with the
equitable powers issue and the separation of powers doctrine,
which constitute the conclusion of his opinion:
It is correct, of course, that a federal judge sitting as a chancellor
is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every
violation of law ...
But these principles take a court only so far. Our system of
government is, after all, a tripartite one, with each Branch hav-
ing certain defined functions delegated to it by the Constitu-
tion. . . . Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has
decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the Execu-
tive to administer the laws and for the courts to enforce them
when enforcement is sought.
Here we are urged to view the Endangered Species Act"reasonably," and hence shape a remedy "that accords with
some modicum of commonsense and the public weal." . .. But
is that our function? We have no expert knowledge on the sub-
ject of endangered species, much less do we have a mandate
from the people to strike a balance of equities on the side of the
Tellico Dam. Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, mak-
ing it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor
of affording endangered species the highest of priorities, thereby
adopting a policy which it described as "institutionalized cau-
tion."
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a
particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be
put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the
meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality
determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit
104. Record at 51-52.
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as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power to
veto ...
We agree with the Court of Appeals that in our constitu-
tional system the commitment to the separation of powers is too
fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by judi-
cially decreeing what accords with "commonsense and the pub-
lic weal." Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the
political Branches.10 1
In addition to the paradox presented by Chief Justice Burger's
unpredictable treatment of the issues of retroactivity, congres-
sional appropriations, and equity power, several of his other re-
marks during the argument appear to unmask a preference for
defendant's position and a hostility toward plaintiffs' argument.
Thus, the Chief Justice seems to give great weight to the Attorney
General's opinion and little to that of the Secretary of Interior.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Attorney General, did you have any
obligation to present the views of the Secretary of the Interior,
or was that merely a matter of comity as one Cabinet officer to
another?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Well, it was more than that. It was a
request.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Request by whom?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: By the Secretary.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: But has it not been historically true that
the United States Government in this Court, and in all Federal
courts, speaks through only one voice, namely, through the At-
torney General of the United States?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: That's what it ought to be.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Historically, that's been the case?
ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: That is, and that's historically been
the case with me, except in this one instance.101
Then, after Justice Marshall asks whether further data is needed
concerning T.V.A.'s transplantation efforts, and Plater replies
that transplantation would in any event not fulfill the require-
ments of the Act, the Chief Justice explodes:
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Do you mean that even if a successful
transplant took place, you'd still be opposing the functioning of
this dam?
MR. PLATER: Not at all, Your Honor, but we would request that
legal procedures be followed. If the transplantation were a suc-
cess so that the species were no longer endangered, the Secretary
105. 98 S. Ct. at 2301-02.
106. Record at 31.
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of Interior, petitioned by TVA, would review the biological data
for this Court and for Congress; would certify that it is no longer
endangered; and would take it off the list; and that would be
the end of the case.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Or else he could simply say that this is
no longer its critical habitat.
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, under the Act, I believe that both of
the elements are separate violations. That is to say, it is illegal
for an agency either to render a species extinct, or to destroy its
critical habitat.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Or to modify its critical habitat.
But if this-this could continue to be an endangered spe-
cies, but if the area flooded by the dam is no longer its critical
habitat, there would be no violation of the statute.
MR. PLATER: Unless-
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: If the fish thrive in the Hiwassee River.
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, if the fish thrive in the Hiwassee
River, then indeed, as Mr. Chief Justice Burger suggested,
through this procedure, this case would come to an end.
But that does not appear to be the biological evidence. As
a matter of fact, it appears that the best place for a species to
live is in its only known natural habitat.
I would indicate to the Court.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Well, that's not historically true for every
species.
MR. PLATER: Well-
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: There have been all sorts of species
transplanted into new areas where they did much better than
they ever did in their original homes.
Isn't that the history of evolution?
MR. PLATER: Your Honor, however, apparently the Hiwassee
River is connected geographically to the Little Tennessee. And
biologists tell us that if the Hiwassee were a good habitat for the
species, it would be there, by the process of evolution; but that
rather, this species turns out to be a highly sensitive indicator
of precisely the qualities of the habitat that the citizens were
fighting about in this case for years before the snail darter was
known to exist.'"
This interchange is scarcely predictive of the language of Chief
Justice Burger's opinion, which, for the most part, agreed with all
of plaintiffs' arguments.
Chief Justice Burger's judicial behavior in the case remains
a conundrum. Among the nine Justices, he was clearly the most
openly hostile to plaintiffs' arguments and, in a sense, personally
107. Id. at 41-43.
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toward Plater. His remarks consistently favored T.V.A.'s position
and opposed the Department of Interior and plaintiffs' point of
view. Yet he authored the majority opinion adopting plaintiffs'
points, and in so doing employed language clearly at odds with
the attitudes he appeared to reveal during oral argument.
One can speculate that when the Chief Justice realized that
a majority of the Court was likely to favor affirming the Sixth
Circuit's decision ordering that an injunction issue, he decided to
join the majority, rather than Justices Powell or Rehnquist, so
that the preference for a "legislative remand" was quite clear.
That is, he might have reasoned that another Justice favoring
plaintiffs' position would, as author of the majority opinion, focus
solely upon the strict statutory construction argument and not
point out sufficiently that the decision was, in effect, opening the
door to congressional or executive action exempting the Tellico
Project from the Act's application or removing the snail darter's
endangered status.08 Although reconstruction of the Court's pre-
cise thought processes is, of course, impossible, this notion, if
entertained by the Chief Justice, appears to be incorrect. Indeed,
plaintiffs' argument was always premised upon the belief that a
full public hearing on the project's cost and benefits was desir-
able. Plaintiffs' position never differed from the view that where
a federal statutory violation exists, an injunction is the appropri-
ate remedy, and if weighing of public policy considerations man-
dates an exemption, that is a legislative, not a judicial, func-
tion. 109 That another Justice-perhaps Justice Stevens or Justice
Stewart-might draft the majority opinion and not adequately
108. Columnist Jack Anderson has suggested a similar hypothesis to explain the
discrepancy between Chief Justice Burger's comments at oral argument and in private
strongly favoring former President Richard Nixon's position in the White House Tapes
case, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), and his later authorship of the unani-
mous opinion compelling Nixon to submit the tapes to the trial court. After noting that
the Chief Justice in private castigated the press for its Watergate coverage and generally
seemed very antagonistic toward newsmen, Anderson notes:
It may seem ironic, therefore, that Burger wrote the 8-0 ruling that com-
pelled Nixon to submit to the trial courts his incriminating secret White House
tapes. But behind the scenes, the chief justice raised pro-Nixon arguments in
the Supreme Court chamber. Even from the bench, he made observations and
asked questions that were sympathetic to Nixon.
Our sources suggest that Burger probably decided that he could help
Nixon more by writing a restrained majority opinion than standing alone in
Nixon's comer. Burger took pains in the decision to give'Nixon credit for good
faith, even though the former president clearly sought to withhold the tapes to
protect himself from public disgrace and criminal charges.
Anderson, Burger Bares Anti-Press Bias, Tacoma News Tribune, Oct. 10, 1978, at A-12.
109. Brief For Respondents at 58-59, T.V.A. v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978).
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rely upon this legislative remand argument seems unlikely. It was
at the heart of plaintiffs' case.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
What conclusions can be drawn based upon the lengthy re-
counting of the Justices' questions and comments and analysis of
them in light of the positions eventually adopted? The investiga-
tion does seem to confirm a few common sense impressions con-
cerning judicial decision-making and predictability of opinions,
regardless of the level of the court involved. For instance, it is
obviously advisable to learn so much as possible about the predis-
positions of the members of the bench prior to oral argument and,
in fact, before preparing final drafts of briefs. Thus, Justices Ste-
vens and Stewart might easily have been predicted to adhere to
a strict interpretation of the statute in reaching their decisions
and Justice White predicted to favor nonintervention by the
Court.
Perhaps as important, it becomes apparent that some im-
pressions litigants have at the time of argument may be incorrect.
Concentration upon trends in questioning is extremely impor-
tant. Thus, Justice White's inquiries are few in number, spread
throughout the hearing, and characterized by few lengthy dis-
courses. Examination of the transcript, however, reveals him as
potentially somewhat favorable toward a compromise resulting in
the affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision. On the other
hand, Justice Blackmun, visualized by the author at the hearing
to be reasonably balanced in his attitude and, therefore, an
enigma as to final position, appears solidly disposed toward
T.V.A.'s views. An ability to synthesize perceived trends in judi-
cial remarks can clearly provide a relatively clear indication of
court members' receptivity to various arguments and possible
compromises.
Why is it important to be able to recognize the attitudes of
the bench during oral argument? At the post-litigation level, it
is, of course, intellectually challenging to conjecture what a court
and the various justices will adopt as their final positions, though
no attorney should advise a client to embark upon a course of
action based upon prediction of result. During the appellate argu-
ment itself, a great deal can be achieved through recognition of
the developing attitudes of the members of the court. Analysis of
this transcript has, for example, shown that some Justices play
quite specific roles as protagonists or antagonists. Identification
of these roles permits the advocate to utilize them to their fullest
extent. The advocate may be able to tailor the argument toward
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certain theories and compromises that reveal themselves as being
favorably viewed or at least acceptable. On the other hand, one
should not pay less attention to a justice merely because he or she
appears hostile or opposed to one's position. While Justice Powell
cast his vote with T.V.A. from the very beginning, to write off
Justices Marshall and Burger might have been a disasterous
error. At the bottom line, an advocate should always attempt to
answer inquiries as directly as possible regardless of source.
From a nonlitigation point of view, analysis of an appellate
argument record in light of judicial positions ultimately taken
provides a fascinating opportunity to speculate upon the intrica-
cies of judicial decision-making. The author does not adhere to
the belief expresssed by some that, because eventual positions
have already been adopted, the questions asked at oral argument
are totally nonpredictive. Indeed, one can argue that precisely
because some positions may have previously been developed,
remarks made ought to be highly predictive. Thus, in T. V.A. v.
Hill, examination of the record indicates the positions of Justices
Stevens, Stewart, and Brennan in favor of affirmance were quite
predictable from their oral argument remarks. So also were the
contrary positions of Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Justices
Blackmun's and White's views were less foreseeable, though care-
ful re-examination and speculation evidence with reasonable
clarity Justice Blackmun's support of T.V.A. and, to a somewhat
lesser extent, Justice White's willingness to compromise and join
the majority. Justice Marshall's judicial behavior remains per-
plexing, though a process of compromise similar to Justice
White's can be hypothesized. Chief Justice Burger is the sole
member of the Court the author found totally unpredictable.
It is somewhat artificial and perhaps misleading to speculate
in hindsight about a judicial decision. Analysis of the transcript
in T. V.A. v. Hill, however, does reveal the two-thirds of the Court
composed of Justices Stevens, Stewart, Brennan, Powell,
Rehnquist, and Blackmun as reasonably predictable. This pre-
diction, nevertheless, still leaves the controversy unresolved at
three votes for each side. If one speculates that Justices White
and Marshall, both favoring a remand to the trial court, are less
likely to join the dissenters than the majority, because to do the
latter will merely preserve the status quo, then a majority of five
members is constituted. This prediction, of course, could not
have been made with a very high degree of certainty at the time
of argument, particularly since the formal record was not yet
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available." 0 Once again, however, one is left with the dilemma of
the Chief Justice, whose inquiries and comments do not seem at
all consistent with his ultimate position.
Perhaps the most one can conclude is what many advocates
already believe and what even most law persons would sus-
pect-that, during oral argument, questions and comments by
members of the court, at least the present United States Supreme
Court Justices, are highly predictive of some of their judical opin-
ions, less so for others, not at all for some, and occasionally totally
misleading. Although this conclusion may reveal little not al-
ready surmised, it at least confirms in a pseudoempirical manner,
and hopefully an interesting manner, what many persons pre-
viously supposed to be true.
110. During the hearing, the author did take hurried notes of the questions asked by
the Justices, but their necessarily abbreviated nature made them an inadequate substi-
tute for the actual record of the proceedings.
